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Introduction
State and local pensions have been headline news 
since the financial collapse reduced the value of their 
assets, leaving a substantial unfunded liability.  The 
magnitude of that liability depends on the interest 
rate used to discount future benefit promises but, 
regardless of the assumptions, states and localities 
are going to have to come up with more money.  This 
brief looks at the size of the additional funding relative 
to state budgets.
The brief proceeds as follows.  The first section 
provides an overview of state and local plans and in-
troduces our sample of six states: California, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.  The 
second section presents data on pension expendi-
tures relative to budget totals for states and localities 
in the aggregate and for our sample of plans.  The 
third section develops baseline budgets for the period 
2010-2043 for all states and localities and for the six 
individual states.  It then projects annual required 
pension contributions beginning in 2014 under three 
scenarios: 1) amortizing the unfunded liability valued 
at an 8-percent discount rate over the next 30 years;  
2) amortizing the unfunded liability valued at 5 per-
cent over the next 30 years; and 3) continuing to pay 
contributions at current levels until the trust fund is 
exhausted and then paying benefits on a pay-as-you-
go basis.  
The final section concludes that whereas public 
plans are substantially underfunded, in the aggregate 
they currently account for only 3.8 percent of state 
and local spending.  Assuming 30-year amortization 
beginning in 2014, this share would rise to only 5.0 
percent and, even assuming a 5-percent discount 
rate, to only 9.1 percent.  Aggregate data, however, 
hide substantial variation.  States that have seriously 
underfunded plans and/or generous benefits, such 
as California, Illinois, and New Jersey, would see 
contributions rise to about 8 percent of budgets with 
an 8-percent discount rate and 12.5 percent with a 
5-percent discount rate.
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Overview of State and Local Plans
The nation’s public pension system consists of both 
state and locally-administered plans.1  The state sys-
tems usually cover general state government employ-
ees and teachers; locally-administered systems often 
cover police and fire, as well as general municipal em-
ployees.  But the structure varies enormously.  Some 
states (Maine and Hawaii) have a single system cover-
ing all types of employees, while other states (Florida, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Pennsylvania) have more than 100 systems.  
State-administered plans account for a tiny frac-
tion of the systems, but almost all the participants and 
assets.  Specifically, state-administered plans account 
for only 9 percent of the systems, but 89 percent of 
the active members and 84 percent of assets (see 
Figure 1).
Figure 1. State-Administered Plans as a Percent 
of Total State and Local Plans, Active Members, 
and Assets, Fiscal Year 2008












Thus, as a generalization, state plans are big and 
locally-administered plans are small.  On average in 
2008, state plans held $12.2 billion in assets, while 
local plans held $0.2 billion (see Figure 2).  Of course, 
every generalization has notable exceptions; six 
locally-administered plans held more than $12 billion 
each.2  
Figure 2. Average Assets per Plan by Type of 












Source: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a). 
In addition to looking at states and localities in 
the aggregate, we will examine six states more closely. 
Three – Florida, Georgia, and Massachusetts – have 
low normal cost, sponsors that pay 100 percent of 
their annual required contribution (ARC), and tend 
to be reasonably well funded (with the exception of 
the Teachers’ plan in Massachusetts). Three – Cali-
fornia, Illinois, and New Jersey – have plans that have 
received a lot of press attention.3   Indeed, these plans 
are generous as measured by their normal cost, their 
sponsors fail to pay the full ARC, and they have lower 
funded ratios (see Table 1).


















California 13.7 85 87
Illinois 12.5 65 60
New Jersey 13.2 57 72
Sources: Authors’ calculations from the Center for Retire-
ment Research at Boston College Public Plans Database 
(CRR PPD) 2009; and various plan reports.
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a). 
One further consideration is important – namely, 
local governments make considerable contributions 
to state systems.  In the aggregate, 44 percent of the 
contributions to state-administered plans comes 
from local governments.  But, as shown in Figure 3, 
this percentage varies enormously across states.  In 
our sample of six states, the fraction ranges from 
zero percent in Massachusetts, where the entire state 
retirement system is financed at the state level, to 79 
percent in Florida, where localities pay almost the full 
cost.  This variation fairly well reflects the variation 
across the universe of state and local plans.       
Pension Contributions as a Share 
of State and Local Budgets
Legislatures and pension-plan administrators often 
focus on pension contributions as a percent of pay-
roll.  Pension contributions as a percent of budgets, 
however, provides a broader framework for project-
ing how public plans will affect other state and local 
activities.  The starting point for our analysis is the 
share of state and local budgets devoted to pensions to 
date.  Figure 4  shows that in 2008 pensions account-
ed for 3.8 percent of state and local direct – that is, 
non-capital – expenditures for the country as whole.    
Figure 4. State and Local Government Direct 











Note: Total budget equals direct expenditures from the 
general fund, excluding capital outlays.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a); and U.S. Census Bureau (2008b).
This share varied somewhat among individual 
states.  However, for more than half of the states, state 
and local pension contributions represented between 
3 and 4 percent of state and local government budgets 
in 2008 (see Figure 5).  The range in our sample of six 
states was similarly narrow – 3.2 percent in Florida to 
5.2 percent in California.  
Figure 5. Distribution of States by Government 
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Pension contribution as a percent of state and local budgets
Source: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a); and U.S. Census Bureau (2008b).It is also interesting to look at the pattern of con-
tributions over time.  As shown in Figure 6, for states 
and localities as a whole, contributions to pensions 
have ranged from 3 to 6 percent of their combined 
budgets.  Contributions were about 4 percent from 
the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, rose to 6 percent be-
tween the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s when states 
and localities “got religion” about the importance of 
funding, then dropped back as the long bull market 
boosted asset values.  Figure 6 also presents infor-
mation for states and localities separately.  Until the 
1990s, pensions accounted for a much higher share 
of state budgets than local budgets.  Today, the shares 
are roughly equal, as non-pension expenditures for 
states have grown more rapidly than those at the local 
level.  
Figure 6.  Government Pension Contributions as 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a); and U.S. Census Bureau (2008b).
Outlook for the Future
Pension contributions are likely to account for a 
larger share of state and local budgets in the future 
than in the past for a number of reasons.  First, states 
and localities have relied on a rising stock market to 
increase funding, and a repeat of the 1982-2000 stock 
market boom is unlikely.  Second, states and localities 
have not been contributing their full ARC, which cov-
ers accruing normal cost and a payment to amortize 
the unfunded liability over a 30-year period.  That 
is, they have not been putting aside the full amount 
recommended by the Government Accounting Stan-
dards Board (GASB).  Finally, the method of calculat-
ing pension liabilities may change over time.  State 
and local plans generally follow an actuarial model 
and discount their liabilities by the expected long-
term yield on the assets held in the pension fund, 
roughly 8 percent.  Most economists contend that the 
discount rate should reflect the risk associated with 
the liabilities and, given that benefits are guaranteed 
under most state laws, the appropriate discount factor 
is a riskless rate, roughly 5 percent.4  Thus, the econo-
mists’ model would produce much higher normal 
cost and liabilities than currently reported.  
Amortizing Unfunded Liabilities
The first step in estimating pension contributions as a 
percent of budgets is to project budgets for states and 
localities.  This projection is based on the relation-
ship of state and local budgets to GDP.5  While these 
budgets rose sharply until 1990, since that time they 
have held relatively steady (see Figure 7).  We assume 
that the 2008 ratio of budgets to GDP will hold into 
the future, so we derive dollar amounts by applying 
the 2008 ratio to GDP projections from the Congres-
sional Budget Office.  The same approach was used to 
project budgets for the six sample states.
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Sources: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a); U.S. Census Bureau (2008b); and the Congressio-
nal Budget Office (2010).Issue in Brief 5
The next step is to project future pension con-
tributions.6  We assume that states and localities 
increase their contributions incrementally between 
2009 and 2013, and then start to pay the full ARC, 
amortizing their unfunded liabilities over a 30-year 
period.7  Normal cost and unfunded liabilities are cal-
culated under two interest rate assumptions – 8 per-
cent and 5 percent.  The results are shown in Figure 
8.  Assuming an 8-percent discount rate, government 
contributions to pensions will rise from 3.8 percent 
of state and local budgets today to 5.0 percent in 2014.   
With a 5-percent discount rate, pension contributions 
would increase to 9.1 percent in 2014.  In both cases, 
the contribution rate remains constant thereafter for 
30 years because contributions are usually set as a 
fixed percent of payrolls and we have assumed that 
payrolls are a fixed percent of state and local budgets.8     
Figure 8. Government Contributions as a Percent 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a); U.S. Census Bureau (2008b); and 2009 CRR PPD.
The pattern differs across states.  Essentially the 
states that have been conscientious about funding 
their pensions would see only a small increase in 
their contributions as a percent of budget – roughly 
1 to 2 percent (see Table 2).  This increase reflects 
primarily the increase in unfunded liabilities as a re-
sult of the collapse in equity prices.  If liabilities were 
discounted at 5 percent, the percent of the budget 
devoted to pension contributions would rise to just 
over 8 percent.  In contrast, those states with expen-
sive and/or underfunded plans would see the percent 
of their budgets going to pensions rise from about 4.5 
percent to about 8 percent (assuming an 8-percent 
discount rate) and to 12.5 percent (assuming a 5-per-
cent discount rate).9  
Table 2. Pension Contributions as a Percent of 
State and Local Budgets, Selected States, 2008 
and 2014-2043




























Illinois 4.5 8.7 13.0
New Jersey 3.5 7.9b 12.0b
a Massachusetts’ 2008 contribution level is based on legisla-
tion that requires the systems to be fully funded by 2023.  
Our analysis extends the full funding date to 2043 for 
purposes of comparison with other states.
b New Jersey contribution rates are for the fiscal years after 
2017, when New Jersey legislation requires plans to fully 
pay the ARC.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a); U.S. Census Bureau (2008b); and 2009 CRR PPD.
 
Exhausting Assets and Reverting to  
Pay-as-you-go
The projections for the high-cost states suggest a very 
large increase in the share of the state-local budget 
that would need to be allocated to pensions.  If policy-
makers are unable or unwilling to make such a com-
mitment, what is the alternative?  Promised benefits 
are legally protected and will be paid.  One alternative 
is to contribute at current levels, run down assets, and 
then pay promised benefits on a pay-as-you go basis.  
Take Illinois as an example.  Figure 9 on the next 
page shows the pattern of expenditure as a percent 
of the budget under a pay-as-you-go scenario.10  The 
pattern is complicated by the fact that Illinois has four 
main pension plans, and each runs out of money at a 
different time.  Since the plan financed by localities is 
relatively well funded and state government currently 
pays the majority of pension costs for the three poorly 
funded plans, the burden of covering benefits paid 
on a pay-as-you-go basis would fall primarily on the 
state.11  Pay-as-you go costs are projected to exceed 
16 percent of the Illinois state government budget in 
2027.Center for Retirement Research 6
Figure 9.  Pay-as-you-go Contributions as a 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a); U.S. Census Bureau (2008b); the Congressional 
Budget Office (2010); and the 2009 CRR PPD.
It is also interesting to compare contributions to 
state-administered plans with the alternative funding 
scenarios (see Figure 10).  In the short run, the state 
of Illinois saves a lot of money by not funding.  But, 
after 2025, pay-as-you-go payments exceed the cost of 
funding with liabilities discounted by 8 percent.  In 
Figure 10.  Contributions to State-Administered 
Plans as a Percent of State and Local Budgets for 
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Note: The pay-as-you-go costs are estimated assuming an 
8-percent return prior to exhaustion.  If assets yield only 
5 percent, costs start to rise two years earlier in 2021, and 
peak two years earlier in 2025, but the overall pattern looks 
very much the same.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2008a); U.S. Census Bureau (2008b); the Congressional 
Budget Office (2010); and the 2009 CRR PPD.
2043 plans reach full-funded status and contributions 
drop back to only normal cost, while pay-as-you-go 
payments continue to remain high.    
Conclusion
The funding shortfall of public pension plans has 
made national news since the financial collapse re-
duced asset values at the same time that state and lo-
cal revenues began to dry up.  The size of the funding 
hole differs depending on the rate used to discount li-
abilities but, regardless of assumptions, governments 
will eventually have to ante up.  How much?  In 2008, 
pension contributions amounted to about 3.8 percent 
of total state and local budgets.  Assuming 30-year 
amortization beginning in 2014, this share would rise 
to only 5.0 percent and even assuming a 5-percent 
discount rate to only 9.1 percent.  
Aggregate data, however, hide substantial varia-
tion.  States with seriously underfunded plans and/
or generous benefits, such as California, Illinois, and 
New Jersey, would see contributions rise to about 8 
percent of budgets with an 8-percent discount rate 
and 12.5 percent with a 5-percent discount rate.  And, 
in states such as California, local governments make 
more than half of the contributions, which means 
that the burden of increased future pension contribu-
tions will fall on the shoulders of localities as well.
How reliable are our estimates?  On the one hand, 
our assumption that plans fund responsibly in the 
near-term may be optimistic in light of the current 
economic conditions.  To the extent they do not, our 
estimates understate the long-term pension costs.  On 
the other hand, we assume no changes in benefits or 
employee contributions.  In fact, states are already 
raising employee contributions and reducing benefits 
for new employees, which means that we overstate 
long-run employer pension costs.  These offsetting 
effects may well cancel out, so that this brief provides 
a reasonable picture of future pension costs as a share 
of state and local spending. Issue in Brief 7
Endnotes
1  Most local plans (81 percent) are administered by 
municipalities and townships, with the remainder by 
counties, special districts, and school districts.  
2  Leading the list were New York City Employees, 
New York City Teachers, and Los Angeles County Em-
ployees with about $40 billion each.  The other large 
locally-administered plans are New York Police ($25 
billion), Los Angeles Fire and Police ($18 billion), and 
San Francisco City and County Employees ($16 bil-
lion).  See U.S. Census Bureau (2008a).
3  For example, see Perez-Pena (2010) and Walsh 
(2010a, 2010b).
4  See Munnell et al. (2010) for a more detailed dis-
cussion of the appropriate discount rate.  
5  See Appendix for a detailed description of the 
methodology used in these calculations.  
6  Our analysis projects future ARC for the 107 larg-
est state-administered pensions in the United States 
under an 8-percent and 5-percent discount rate.  
These plans account for more than 75 percent of total 
state and local pension contributions in the United 
States.
7  Three states – Illinois, Massachusetts, and New 
Jersey – do not follow the traditional 30-year fund-
ing schedule described above.  In Illinois, current 
legislation mandates that the state plans become 90 
percent funded by 2045.  In 2003, Illinois issued $10 
billion in general obligation bonds, the proceeds of 
which reduced the unfunded liabilities of the state 
plans.  Contribution rates in this state are therefore 
set as the minimum of either the statutory rate, or 
the difference between the statutory rate and the 
amount required to service the debt (Illinois, 2009).  
In Massachusetts, the state retirement plans have 
historically been required by statute to be fully funded 
by 2023.  In 2010, this period was extended to 2025.  
Lastly, in New Jersey, 2010 legislation allows the state 
to pay only one-seventh of its full ARC in 2011.  Each 
subsequent year’s payment increases by an addi-
tional one-seventh, until the full ARC is paid in 2018 
(NCSL, 2010).  We account for this gradual increase 
when calculating future normal cost and amortization 
payments.
8  In reality, state and local payrolls as a percent of 
budgets have steadily declined about 40 percent over 
the past 50 years.  This decline is somewhat greater 
for states than for localities.  If this trend continues, 
as the GAO projects (GAO, 2010), our assumption 
that payrolls remain a constant percent of budgets in 
the future overstates the effect of pension contribu-
tions on future state and local budgets.  
9  In states where local governments are responsible 
for a large percentage of the total required contribu-
tion, such as Florida and California, these projections 
imply that rising pension costs could become a major 
burden on cities and towns. 
10  See Appendix for a detailed description of the 
methodology used in these calculations.  
11  Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund is entirely 
financed by localities.  Illinois State Employees 
Retirement System and Illinois University System 
are entirely financed by the State.  Illinois Teachers 
Retirement System is financed jointly, 11.2 percent of 
contributions from localities and 88.8 percent from 
the State.  APPENDIXIssue in Brief 9
Appendix
Estimating the effect of future pension costs on future budgets requires making projections of state and local 
budgets, amortization payments, normal cost, and benefit payments.
Baseline Budgets
Throughout this analysis, state and local budgets are equal to direct expenditures from the general fund, minus 
capital outlays, plus pension contributions.  The primary data source for the first two terms is the Census of 
Governments’ Government Finances dataset.  These data contain detailed information on each government’s 
total expenditures, but exclude contributions to pension plans that the government administers.  For example, 
expenditure data for the state government of Massachusetts do not include contributions to either the Massa-
chusetts State Employees Retirement System or the Teachers Retirement System.  A separate Employee Retire-
ment Systems dataset, also collected by the Census, provides the missing pension contribution information 
needed to calculate total government expenditures. 
Budgett  =  general direct expendituret  –  capital outlayst  +  pension contributions to own plant
To project baseline budgets into the future, we assume that state and local budgets remain a constant percent 
of GDP. 
Budgett+1  =  (Budgett   / GDPt)  *  GDPt+1 
Pension contributions and salaries are similarly assumed to remain a constant portion of future budgets. 
Revised Budgets including Projected Pension Contributions under the 
Full-Funding Scenario
The analysis assumes that, in the near future, governments will continue to pay less than their required 
contributions in order to weather the current financial crisis.  We estimate that plans will not make their full 
ARC until 2014.  Because, historically, contribution payments have held relatively steady for each plan, we 
estimate contributions from 2010 to 2013 based on an average of the prior three years, plus a 5-percent per-
year increase (the average increase between 1990-2007).  To obtain estimates of pension costs in 2014, we first 
must determine the funded level of plans in 2013.  To do this, we draw on the model developed in Munnell, 
Aubry, and Quinby (2010a), which uses each individual plan’s actuarial asset calculation method and historical 
liability growth to project funded levels in 2013 under various economic performance scenarios.  The analysis 
in this brief uses the most likely scenario, which assumes economic growth sufficient to reduce unemployment 
slightly, increase profits by 7 percent annually, and produce a Wilshire 5000 of 15,000 by 2013.
In order to calculate the contributions towards the unfunded liability, the 2013 unfunded liability is amortized 
as a level percent of payroll over a closed 30-year period until it is reduced to zero:
UAALt+1  =  (UAALt  –  (contribution rateplan  *  payrollt))  *  (1  +  discount rate) 
The discount rate and future payroll growth are those used in each plan’s most recent valuation.  For the plans 
in our sample, the discount rate falls between 7.5 and 8.0 percent, and the assumed future payroll growth 
ranges from 3.5 to 4.5 percent.  
In order to calculate UAAL contributions under the 5-percent discount rate projection, the amortization exer-
cise described above is repeated with the initial 2013 unfunded liability discounted at 5 percent, and setting the 
discount rate to 5 percent in the above equation.  Munnell et al. (2010) developed the actuarial model used to 
recalculate unfunded liabilities under different discount rates.Center for Retirement Research 10
For both the 8-percent and 5-percent projections, we assume that normal cost stays constant as a percent of 
payroll.  The 8-percent scenario uses the normal cost reported in plans’ most recent actuarial valuations, while 
the 5-percent scenario uses the method developed in Munnell et al. (2010) to estimate normal cost.
Budget estimates for 2014 onward replace pension contributions from the baseline budget with our estimated 
normal cost and the amortization payments.  
            New Budgett  =  Budgett  –  contributions to state plant  +  normal costt  +  amortization paymentst
Revised Budgets including Projected Benefit Payments under the  
Pay-as-you-go Scenario
For the years 2010 to 2045, projected future benefit payments for the Illinois SERS, Illinois TRS, and Illinois 
Universities are taken directly each plan’s most recent actuarial valuation.  Because benefit projections are not 
reported in the actuarial valuation for the Illinois Municipal Retirement System, we apply the average change 
in annual projected benefits among the other three plans in order to estimate future benefits for the Illinois 
Municipal Plan.  For years beyond 2045, the model first described in Munnell et al. (2010) calculates future 
benefit payments for all four plans.  Using these projections, we estimate the year that each plan would exhaust 
its assets if it were to continue contributing at historical rates as a percent of payroll going forward.  Assets are 
assumed to grow according to the increase in the Dow Jones under the most likely scenario described in Mun-
nell, Aubry, and Quinby (2010a).  To determine the budget, as each of the four plans exhausts, contributions for 
that plan are replaced with its benefit payments.
{
Budgett            if exhaustion dateallplans  > t ≥ 2014   
New Budgett =
Budgett  –  contributions    plan,t +  benefit paymentsplan,t               if t  ≥  exhaustion dateplan 
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